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Abstract 
This study examined how ownership and the degree of competition in the market were related 
to pure technical efficiency, using micro-level hospital data from six regions in Vietnam that 
were collected by an original survey. According to the results, the provincial hospitals have 
significantly higher efficiency than the district hospitals, while the private hospitals have 
significantly lower efficiency than the district hospitals. Moreover, the number of competing 
hospitals has a statistically significant negative correlation with the efficiency of the hospitals, 
and so does the number of competing private hospitals. On the other hand, the degree of 
concentration in the market has no significant correlation with efficiency. Those results may 
imply that competition raises problems with resource allocation among the hospitals in 
Vietnam. 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays the efficiency of medical institutions is of great interest to many countries, since they 
suffer from a rapid increase in health care expenditures. The situation in Vietnam is no exception. 
The total health expenditures of Vietnam increased from 5.4 percent of GDP in 2005 to 7.1 
percent in 2014 (World Health Organization 2017). Indeed, the total health care expenditure 
grew by 18.7 percent per year on average during the period. In addition to that, the share of 
people aged 65 and over in Vietnam was forecasted to reach as high as 21.0 percent in 2050,1 
while it was estimated to be 6.7 percent in 2015 (United Nations 2015). As discussed in Oxley 
(2009), aging brings several new challenges to health care delivery, such as an increase in the 
demand for health care for chronic disease and coordination between health care and long-term 
care. Those challenges will add pressure to the national health care system of Vietnam to become 
more efficient in the future, as aging gradually changes the structure of health care demand. 
One of the remarkable characteristics of health care delivery in Vietnam is its high 
dependency on the public sector which basically consists of central, provincial, district, and 
commune-level medical institutions. The number of public hospitals was 1,095 2 in 2012, 
including 820 general hospitals, while there were 155 private hospitals in 2013 (Ministry of 
Health 2013). This proves that public medical institutions play a substantial role in health care 
delivery. 
However, the situation has been changing as a result of several health care reforms since 
the 1990s. The points of those reforms are twofold. The first point is related to the autonomy of 
public hospitals. The government of Vietnam launched a public health insurance program in 
1993, four years after the introduction of user fees; it introduced a schedule of user fees for 
                                            
1 The forecast is the medium variant case. 
2 The number is calculated as the sum of the number of general hospitals, special hospitals, traditional 
medicine hospitals, leprosariums, sanatoriums, and rehabilitation facilities. 
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consultations and physical examinations, inpatient days, technical services, and lab tests in 1995 
(Lieberman and Wagstaff 2009). Subsequently, Decree 10/2002/ND-CP provided public 
hospitals with limited financial autonomy which allowed them to recover operating costs, reduce 
staff, and increase salaries for workers through surplus revenues; the autonomy was later 
extended by Decree 43/2006/ND-CP so that they would be provided with autonomy and 
accountability in operations, organization, human resources, and financing of all public services 
(Oanh et al. 2015). Those policies jointly made it possible for public hospitals to act, at least 
partially, like private hospitals and compete with each other.3 
The second point is associated with emerging private hospitals. Non-state providers 
were officially recognized as a part of the Vietnamese health care system by the state ordinance 
in 1993 (Hort et al. 2011). The recent growth of private hospitals is particularly remarkable. The 
number of private hospitals increased by more than 50 percent in only four years, from 102 in 
2009 to 155 in 2013 (Ministry of Health 2010; Ministry of Health 2013). Together with the 
extension of autonomy of public hospitals, this brought competition between public and private 
hospitals in the market, especially in urban areas where many of the private hospitals are located. 
Those reforms are, in principle, considered to improve efficiency in hospitals by 
encouraging competition in the market. In other words, they intend to make the health care 
system of Vietnam more market-oriented than before. However, their impacts on hospital 
efficiency have not been analyzed sufficiently. The effect of competition may not be so simple, 
since it depends on the framework of the health care system. For instance, the impact of 
competition in the market on hospitals is likely to vary according to ownership, which affects 
their incentive structure. 
                                            
3 According to Lieberman and Wagstaff (2009), Decree 43/2006/ND-CP provided hospital directors 
with full control over manpower and subordinate units as well as power to set fees within a band; it was 
applicable to health facilities that were not able to recover any of their recurrent costs through user fee 
revenues. 
 4 
 
This study aims to provide empirical evidence to address the extent to which 
competition and ownership are related to the efficiency of hospitals in Vietnam. In particular, it 
focuses on the pure technical efficiency of provincial, district, and private general hospitals in 
the local market. The analysis is based on the pooled data as of 2011, 2012, and 2013, which was 
collected in six regions by an original survey. As a part of the methodology of the analysis, DEA 
(Data Envelopment Analysis) is employed to measure the technical efficiency of the samples. 
The paper develops as follows. First of all, Section 2 provides an overview of health care 
delivery in Vietnam. Next, preceding studies are reviewed in Section 3. The analytical 
framework is presented in Section 4. Section 5 explains the original survey for data collection. In 
Section 6, data and explanatory variables used in the analysis are summarized. Section 7 
describes the results of model estimation, followed by Section 8 in which their interpretation and 
implication are discussed. Section 9 is the conclusion. 
 
2. Overview of health care delivery in Vietnam 
The system of health care delivery in Vietnam is characterized by the mixture of two groups of 
providers, i.e. public and private medical institutions, each of which follows a different 
regulatory framework. This section will present several important factors to illustrate how health 
care delivery in Vietnam works, especially in relation to hospitals. To summarize the conclusion 
first, the current framework of health care delivery of Vietnam implies that public hospitals, 
which receive subsidies from the government on the basis of various levels of autonomy, 
compete against private hospitals, which have full autonomy and no subsidies, and that they are 
likely to compete for human resources as well as for patients. 
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Classifications of medical institutions. Vietnam has four tiers of public medical 
institutions: central, provincial, 4  district, and commune-level, with the exception of those 
managed by the organizations other than either the Ministry of Health (MOH) or the Department 
of Health (DOH) of a province. Basically, the central-level institutions are managed by MOH 
and the others are managed by the DOH of the province where they are located. The central, 
provincial, and district-level institutions are classified into those for either general treatment or 
specialized treatment.5 In particular, general hospitals provide both inpatient and outpatient 
health care. All of them must have at least two of the following departments—internal medicine, 
surgery, obstetrics and pediatrics—in order to be granted an operational license. Central and 
provincial general hospitals usually have more specialties than district hospitals. At the 
commune level, commune health centers (CHCs) provide primary care and health-related 
services, including maternity health and infectious disease prevention.  
In contrast to public medical institutions, private medical institutions, including 
hospitals and clinics, have no structural classification based on administrative units. Generally 
speaking, private hospitals have a variety of scales, equipment, and specialties. They also have 
various types of ownership, such as private-owned, joint-stock, and fully foreign-owned. 
Moreover, all of them appear to be founded as for-profit institutions. This was underpinned by 
the original survey stated in Section 5. Hort et al. (2011) also reported that none of the non-state 
hospitals in their case studies of Ho Chi Minh City was not-for-profit, though the decree 
allowing non-state hospital operation stipulated that hospitals should operate as not-for-profit 
entities. 
                                            
4 In Vietnam, municipalities or centrally-run cities are regarded as an administrative unit equivalent to a 
province. In this paper, provincial-level medical institutions include municipality-level ones. 
5 General treatment institutions include general hospitals and regional polyclinics. Special treatment 
institutions include sanatorium, leprosarium, special hospitals, traditional medicine hospitals, special 
clinics, and maternity homes. 
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Differentiation of roles among hospitals. In Vietnam, there exists a referral system 
among different levels of public medical institutions under the public health insurance scheme. 
People are requested to register with their local medical institutions, typically either a district 
hospital or a CHC, which they contact first in need of treatment of primary care. In principle, 
hospitals at a high level, such as provincial and central hospitals, are expected to provide 
secondary or tertiary care under the system. However, in reality, a patient can go directly to a 
provincial hospital or a central hospital without any referrals, if she pays more than the 
copayment of public health insurance which a patient with a referral from a primary care medical 
institution at a lower level pays. Alternatively, a patient can choose a private hospital instead of a 
public one just in order to avoid the referral system, if she can accept that public health insurance 
will only cover the cost of treatment which would be equivalent to that of a public hospital at the 
same level. This implies that not only private hospitals but also public hospitals at different 
levels compete for patients with each other in the same health care market. 
Regulation and management of hospitals. Public hospitals are under control of the 
authorities with respect to operation and management, including finance, investments, and the 
price of health care service. For instance, all of the public hospitals must obtain approval of their 
investment plans from MOH, or both DOH and the local People’s Committee; they are not 
allowed to set their own service prices because MOH and the Ministry of Finance have devised a 
list with price ranges for each health care service (Oanh et al. 2015). From a viewpoint of 
financing operating costs, the degree of autonomy of public hospitals is threefold: fully 
self-financed institutions which have revenue sources to cover their entire operating costs; 
partially self-financed institutions; and fully-subsidized institutions which have poor or no 
revenue sources to cover their operating costs. However, as discussed later in Section 8, the 
number of fully self-financed institutions is quite small. Most public hospitals still receive 
subsidies from the government, even if a public hospital manager has great autonomy to control 
medical resources as a result of the regulatory reforms. On the other hand, the regulation of 
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private hospitals with respect to operation and management is much weaker than that of public 
hospitals. They have complete autonomy over their finances and investments as well as freedom 
to set their service prices, instead of no right to receive subsidies from the government. In that 
sense, private hospitals are not on an equal footing with public hospitals in terms of conditions of 
competition in the health care market. 
Human resources. All health care professionals, including doctors, nurses, and 
pharmacists, are required to obtain a license to engage in the designated medical activities in 
Vietnam. In particular, a medical doctor in Vietnam is equivalent to a physician usually called a 
doctor in the other countries, while there is another health professional called an assistant 
doctor.6 The number of medical doctors per 10,000 people is steadily increasing, from 7.20 in 
2010 to 7.34 in 2012 (Ministry of Health 2013). However, in general, medical doctors tend to be 
concentrated in urban areas, which leads to shortage of human resources in rural areas. The share 
of medical doctors working in four big municipalities, i.e. Hanoi, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City 
and Can Tho, is as high as approximately 20 percent (Ministry of Health 2013). In fact, many 
district hospitals and CHCs have not been able to recruit any medical doctors for many years, 
while their migration to other localities continues (Ministry of Health and Health Partnership 
Group 2013). It is likely that the situation is partly a result of competition to attract human 
resources among hospitals in urban areas where they may face more competition for patients 
than rural areas. 
  
                                            
6 A medical doctor is a physician who graduated from a medical doctor course at a medical university 
(6-year training course or equivalent). They include those who completed post-graduate level education, 
such as Ph.D. and Master’s courses. An assistant doctor is a physician that graduated from a general 
physician assistant course at a medical college or a medical secondary school, typically trained for 2 or 3 
years. 
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3. Review of preceding studies 
There exists a substantial number of empirical studies which examined whether competition or 
ownership is related to the technical efficiency of hospitals. However, they did not necessarily 
yield the same conclusions about it. First, let’s take studies of the United States as an example. 
Register and Bruning (1987) analyzed non-long-term-care hospitals except federal government 
hospitals in large SMSAs (Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas) and found no significant 
difference in efficiency between for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals. Valdmanis (1990) 
showed that public hospitals were more efficient than private not-for-profit hospitals, using data 
from acute-care general hospitals with 200 or more beds in SMSAs of Michigan with a 
population greater than 500,000. Ozcan, Luke and Haksever (1992) used data from acute-care 
general hospitals in all SMSAs and obtained the result that government hospitals tended to 
comprise a larger percentage of the efficient hospitals than private for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals regardless of regions, market sizes, or hospital scales. Chirikos and Sear (1994) 
reported that the net advantage of for-profit hospitals on efficiency was significant and positive 
in less competitive markets and that such an advantage disappeared in very competitive markets, 
based on analysis of short-term acute-care hospitals in Florida. They also showed that the 
efficiency of the hospitals was significantly lower in markets with more vigorous competition. 
The situation is quite similar with respect to other developed countries. 
Dalmau-Matarrodona and Puig-Junoy (1998) conducted an analysis of hospitals in Catalonia, 
Spain. They reported that the number of competitors in the market presented a significant 
positive contribution on efficiency and that neither ownership nor the degree of concentration in 
the market made any difference. Another study of EU countries is Tiemann and Schreyögg 
(2009), which used the data of acute-care hospitals in Germany. They showed that the degree of 
concentration in the market had a significant positive association with efficiency and that public 
hospitals operated at a significantly higher level of efficiency than private for-profit and 
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not-for-profit hospitals. Chua, Palangkaraya and Yong (2011) analyzed data from hospitals in 
Victoria, Australia. They found a significant negative link between efficiency and the number of 
competing private hospitals as well as between efficiency and the degree of concentration in the 
market. 
Regarding developing countries, Masiye (2007) found no significant difference in 
efficiency between government-owned hospitals and other types of hospitals, including mission 
and private hospitals, in Zambia. Maredza (2012) showed that both public hospitals and 
for-profit hospitals were more efficient than the other types of hospitals in Zimbabwe. 
Jehu-Appiah et al. (2014) reported that private ownership negatively affected efficiency of the 
hospitals in Ghana. 
The variety of the results in the preceding studies is attributable to the complexity of 
how the business environment of hospitals is related to their efficiency. Hence, it is meaningful 
to analyze how competition and ownership is associated with the efficiency of hospitals in the 
context of market-oriented policies in Vietnam. However, as far as I know, there are not any 
studies of Vietnam the results of which are able to be directly compared with those of the 
preceding studies. Though a few studies, such as Nguyen and Giang (2007) and Uslu and Linh 
(2008), attempted to explore factors related to efficiency of hospitals in Vietnam, they did not 
focus on either difference in efficiency between public and private hospitals or the relationship 
between competition and efficiency. This study is an attempt to fill a gap in the empirical studies 
of Vietnam regarding that point. 
 
4. Analytical framework 
From a viewpoint of methodology, the preceding studies summarized in Section 3 are classified 
into three groups. The first group directly tests whether statistically significant difference exists 
in the DEA efficiency scores among hospitals with different types of ownership (Valdmanis 
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1990; Ozkan, Luke and Haksever 1992; and Masiye 2007). The second group uses a so-called 
two-stage DEA approach—a combination of DEA and a type of regression analyses of DEA 
efficiency scores—in order to identify the factors related to efficiency of hospitals (Register and 
Bruning 1987; Chirikos and Sear 1994; Dalmau-Matarrodona and Puig-Junoy 1998; Maredza 
2012; Jehu-Appiah et al. 2014). The third group applies a bootstrapping technique to estimating 
either robust coefficients of explanatory variables or robust confidence intervals of coefficients 
of explanatory variables in the second step of the two-stage DEA approach (Tiemann and 
Schreyogg 2009;  Chua, Palangkaraya and Yong 2011). 
This study adopts a two-stage DEA approach with bootstrapping as the analytical 
framework, the same estimation strategy as the third group. The first part estimates efficiency 
scores of the samples by DEA. Technical efficiency has two different concepts. Overall 
technical efficiency is the maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs subject to 
the condition that the similar ratios for every DMU (Decision Making Unit) be less than or equal 
to unity (Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes 1978). By definition, it assumes constant return-to-scale 
in the sense that maximum efficiency is attainable at any scale where both a numerator and a 
denominator which jointly realize the maximum efficiency are multiplied by a positive scale 
parameter. Another concept is pure technical efficiency, which is defined at the given level of 
operations for each DMU where an efficiency rating of one is assigned to a DMU if and only if 
the DMU lies on the efficiency production surface, even if it may not be operating at the most 
efficient scale size. In this case, the maximum average productivity realized at a scale is not 
necessarily attainable at the other scales (Banker, Charnes and Cooper 1984). In other words, it 
assumes variable return-to-scale. Because of constraints and regulations associated with hospital 
management in Vietnam, it is plausible to assume variable return-to-scale. Moreover, the 
input-oriented approach is more suitable than the output-oriented approach, since health care 
demand derives from disease or bad health conditions, the occurrence of which is beyond the 
control of a health care provider. Hence, this study uses a concept of input-oriented pure 
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technical efficiency scores in the analysis. The second part is based on Simar and Wilson (2007), 
where a truncated regression analysis of those efficiency scores and bootstrapping to estimate 
confidence intervals of coefficients of explanatory variables are conducted. As they argued, a 
truncated regression is appropriate because of the property of DEA based on finite samples; and 
bootstrapping is required to address an estimation bias of coefficients of explanatory variables in 
the two-stage DEA approach. 
More concretely, DEA estimates the input-oriented pure technical efficiency score for 
each of the samples by solving the following linear programming problem: 
𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 = min � 𝜃𝜃| 𝜃𝜃 > 0,𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘 ≤�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
,𝜃𝜃𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 ≥�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
,�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
= 1, 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 ≥ 0( 1 ≤ ∀𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑛𝑛) � 
where 𝑛𝑛 is the number of samples; 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘 is the efficiency score of sample 𝑘𝑘, 𝜃𝜃𝑗𝑗 ∈ ℝ+
𝑝𝑝  (1 ≤ 𝑗𝑗 ≤
𝑛𝑛) is a p-input vector of hospital 𝑗𝑗, 𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 ∈ ℝ+𝑞𝑞  (1 ≤ 𝑗𝑗 ≤ 𝑛𝑛) is a q -output vector of hospital 𝑗𝑗, and {𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘} is a set of the weights corresponding to 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘, respectively. The difference in implementation 
of measurement between pure technical efficiency and overall technical efficiency is that pure 
technical efficiency requires the weight condition ∑ 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 = 1 , while overall technical 
efficiency does not in its calculation of efficiency. 
Additionally, the following model is assumed in order to describe the relationship 
between an efficiency score and explanatory variables: 
δ𝑖𝑖 = 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 ≥ 1 
where δ𝑖𝑖 = 1𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 , a reciprocal of the sample 𝑖𝑖’s efficiency score corresponding to 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖, 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖  is a 
vector of explanatory variables of sample 𝑖𝑖, and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is an error term of sample 𝑖𝑖 following the 
normal distribution N(0,σ2) left-truncated at (1 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽), respectively.  
The first part is to estimate 𝛿𝛿 = �𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘�
1≤𝑘𝑘≤𝑛𝑛
= � 1
𝜃𝜃�𝑘𝑘
�
1≤𝑘𝑘≤𝑛𝑛
 by DEA. In the second part, a 
truncated regression of �?̂?𝛿𝑘𝑘�
𝑘𝑘∈𝑀𝑀
on 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘 where M = �𝑚𝑚|𝛿𝛿m > 1,1 ≤ 𝑚𝑚 < 𝑛𝑛� is conducted first 
to obtain �?̂?𝛽,𝜎𝜎�2�. Subsequently, the following step (a) and (b) are repeated 𝐿𝐿 times: (a) draw {𝜀𝜀̃𝑘𝑘} from 𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎�2) left-truncated at �1 − 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖?̂?𝛽� to construct �𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘|?̂̂?𝛿𝑘𝑘 = 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘?̂?𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀̃𝑘𝑘�
𝑘𝑘∈𝑀𝑀
 ; and 
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(b) conduct a truncated regression of �𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘�
𝑘𝑘∈𝑀𝑀
 on 𝑧𝑧𝑘𝑘  to obtain �?̂̂?𝛽,𝜎𝜎��2� . It is possible to 
construct 100 × (1 − 𝛼𝛼)  percent confidence interval for ?̂?𝛽𝑠𝑠 , 𝑠𝑠 th element of ?̂?𝛽 , from the 
bootstrap results �?̂̂?𝛽𝑏𝑏�
1≤𝑏𝑏≤𝐿𝐿
as 𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼
2
𝑠𝑠 ≤ ?̂̂?𝛽𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠 − ?̂?𝛽𝑠𝑠 ≤ 𝑡𝑡1−𝛼𝛼
2
𝑠𝑠 , or ?̂̂?𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠�1−𝛼𝛼
2
�
− 𝑡𝑡1−𝛼𝛼
2
𝑠𝑠 ≤ ?̂?𝛽𝑖𝑖 ≤ ?̂̂?𝛽𝑏𝑏
𝑠𝑠
�
𝛼𝛼
2
�
− 𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼
2
𝑠𝑠 , 
where 𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠  is (100 × 𝛼𝛼)  percentile point of ?̂̂?𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 − ?̂?𝛽𝑠𝑠  and ?̂̂?𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠(𝛼𝛼)  is the value of ?̂̂?𝛽𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 
corresponding to 𝑡𝑡𝛼𝛼𝑠𝑠 . Here 𝐿𝐿 = 2,000 is chosen for the stability of bootstrap estimation. 
 
5. Survey design for data collection 
Though some regional-level data from hospitals in Vietnam are available (Ministry of Health 
2010 and Ministry of Health 2013, for instance), it is impossible to measure and analyze the 
efficiency of each hospital with such aggregated data. In order to overcome the constraints of 
data availability, this study collected micro-level hospital data as of all estimation periods, i.e. 
2011, 2012, and 2013, by the original survey. This was conducted using a face-to-face method, 
with a follow-up by e-mail or telephone in order to address inconsistency of the collected data. 
Sample regions. Though the number of private hospitals in Vietnam has been growing, it 
is still much smaller than that of public hospitals, as described in Section 1. Generally speaking, 
private hospitals in Vietnam are concentrated in urban areas. Hence, six regions which consist of 
four municipalities (Hanoi, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, and Can Tho) and two provinces 
around those municipalities (An Giang and Binh Duong) were chosen as the sample regions so 
that a sufficient number of private as well as public hospitals would be included in the samples. 
Listed hospitals. Since this study focuses on the market of general hospitals, the original 
survey required a complete list of general hospitals located in the sample regions to conduct the 
sampling of hospitals. The listed hospitals should include: public hospitals which consist of 
central, provincial, and district hospitals; public hospitals managed by the ministries other than 
MOH (e.g. Ministry of Defense); and private hospitals. In cooperation with MOH and DOHs of 
the sample regions, 179 general hospitals that had operated between 2011 and 2013 were 
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identified and listed. The basic information of those hospitals including ownership types and the 
number of actual beds, inpatient discharges, and outpatient physician visits was obtained from 
their database as well. 
Sample hospitals. Ideally, the sample hospitals should have included all of the hospitals 
in the list. However, the coverage of hospitals in the original survey was restricted to provincial, 
district, and private hospitals. Central hospitals were eliminated from the sample hospitals since 
they were generally incomparable with respect to input of medical resources which may affect 
the quality of service. Additionally, extremely small private hospitals were also eliminated since 
they were likely to have difficulty in providing detailed data for the survey. In this regard, the list 
included several private hospitals with fewer than 50 actual beds, while public hospitals meeting 
that condition were rare. Hence, all of the provincial and district hospitals, and all of the private 
hospitals with no fewer than 50 actual beds, were chosen as the sample hospitals from the listed 
hospitals which operated at the time of the survey. Eventually, the sample hospitals included 128 
hospitals (23 provincial, 69 district, and 36 private hospitals), with 114 hospitals (23 provincial, 
69 district, and 22 private hospitals) answering the survey questionnaire developed to collect 
data on the individual business environments as well as input and output. 
 
6. Data and variables 
DEA, the first part of the analysis, requires both input and output data to estimate efficiency 
scores. The indicators of input and output are crucially important, since their choice will have a 
large impact on the estimation results. Typical preceding studies used the number of health 
professionals and/or the number of actual beds as input, and the number of inpatient 
admissions/discharges and/or outpatient physician visits as output in order to estimate efficiency 
scores. 
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Basically following those studies, the input of this study has four indicators: three 
associated with labor input and one with capital input. The former includes the number of 
medical doctors, assistant doctors, and nurses. All of them are evaluated in terms of a full-time 
equivalent (FTE). In particular, the input of medical doctors is distinguished from that of 
assistant doctors, since they are considered to play different roles in medical practices. 
Regarding the latter, the number of actual beds is used as a proxy of capital input. The basic idea 
is that it will be closely related to the physical scale of a hospital which is likely to be correlated 
with capital input. The output indicators consist of the number of inpatient discharges and 
outpatient physician visits so that inpatient care will be distinguished from outpatient care in 
terms of output. 
DEA is followed by the second part, a truncated regression analysis of the estimated 
efficiency scores to identify the relationship between explanatory variables and efficiency scores 
of the samples. The explanatory variables in the model include: average length of stay (ALOS), 
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the number of competing hospitals, the number of 
competing private hospitals, ownership type dummies, regional dummies, and time trend 
dummies. HHI, the number of competing hospitals, the number of competing private hospitals, 
and regional dummies are common among all of the samples located in the same region, while 
the other variables except for time trend dummies describe the individual business environment 
of a sample. Time trend dummies are common among all of the samples. More detailed 
definitions and explanations of the explanatory variables follow. 
Average length of stay (ALOS). Ideally, case-mix adjusted output of both inpatient and 
outpatient treatment should be used to estimate efficiency scores. One approach is to use the 
information from DRGs (Diagnosis-Related Groups) or a similar diagnostic classification 
system in order to obtain either a case-mix index of output or the case-mix weights for each of 
the outputs. For instance, Ozcan, Luke and Haksever (1992), Chirikos and Sear (1994), and 
Chua, Palangkaraya and Yong (2011) employed this approach. Another approach is to 
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approximate the case-mix weight for each diagnosis by an alternative indicator, as 
Dalmau-Matarrodona and Puig-Junoy (1998) did using ALOS by diagnosis. Unfortunately, 
either approach is impossible in this study due to limited available data.7 Instead, overall ALOS 
is used as a proxy of the degree of case-mix complexity of inpatients in the model. ALOS is 
considered to represent persistent cases which require significant resources (Maretza 2012). The 
more such cases there are, the longer overall ALOS becomes. Consequently, it is likely to be 
correlated with the degree of case-mix complexity of inpatients.8 
On the other hand, the case-mix of outpatients is not explicitly considered in the analysis. 
In Vietnam, all of the outpatients are consulted first at the outpatient department primarily to 
determine whether they should be admitted as inpatients. Hence, the degree of case-mix 
complexity of outpatients will not affect the results of the analysis significantly. 
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The motivation to include HHI as an explanatory 
variable in the model is to capture the relationship between efficiency and the level of 
competition in the market. HHI is defined as the sum of the squared market share for each 
hospital. One of the crucial points to calculate HHI is the definition of the market. In order to 
analyze the market structure of hospitals, the geographic market delineation should be based on 
the flow of patients among regions.9 However, the collection of such detailed data was so 
burdensome for hospitals that it was impossible to carry it out in the original survey. One of the 
alternatives is to use an administrative area as the geographic market. For instance, Tiemann and 
Schreyögg (2009) used the area of a county for that purpose. Similarly, it is possible in principle 
to use a district area in Vietnam. However, such an approach may be inappropriate, since a 
                                            
7 According to Matsushima and Yamada (2013), only two pilot hospitals participated in the Vietnamese 
DRG system; it was applied to patients with acute pneumonia for adults and children, appendix 
operation and normal delivery. 
8 For instance, regarding acute inpatients, the data from Medicare in the United States in fiscal year 
2014 shows that the correlation coefficient between DRG weights and the corresponding ALOS is 0.844 
and statistically significant at 1 percent significance level (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
2014). 
9 Elzinga and Hogarty (1973) and Zwanziger and Melnick (1988) are the examples of methods of 
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district has basically only one district hospital. It is not plausible to assume that a district hospital 
has a monopolistic power in the district whenever it is the only hospital located there. Because of 
the situation above, this study uses the area of a region, i.e. a municipality or a province, as the 
geographic market. In other words, the calculation of HHI defined here assumes that all of the 
hospitals in a region have the same geographic market as the area of that region. 
Another point is the choice of indicators to measure output shares. In this study, the 
market share of a hospital is calculated in two ways: one is the share of the number of actual beds 
and the other is the share of the number of inpatient discharges. In both of the cases, it is required 
to process the samples before calculating HHI so that a change in observability of a hospital 
during the estimation period, i.e. from 2011 to 2013, will not affect the calculation results. In the 
case of actual-bed-based HHI, the samples that did not have all of data on the number of actual 
beds during all estimation periods were dropped, unless it was the case that a hospital entered or 
withdrew from the market during the period. The samples in the case of 
inpatient-discharge-based HHI were handled in the same way. As a result, the samples used to 
calculate actual-bed-based HHI and those used to calculate inpatient-discharge based HHI do 
not coincide. 
The number of competing hospitals and the number of competing private hospitals. For 
each actual-bed-based HHI and inpatient-discharge-based HHI, the number of competing 
hospitals is calculated as the sum of the number of the hospitals included in the computation of 
the corresponding (i.e. actual-bed-based or inpatient-discharge-based) HHI. As 
Dalmau-Matarrodona and Puig-Junoy (1998) argued, it is possible to approximate the level of 
competition by the number of competitors and the degree of concentration. Introducing the 
number of competing hospitals together with HHI into the model makes it possible to analyze 
the former and the latter separately. The definition of the number of competing private hospitals 
                                                                                                                                
geographic market delineation based on goods or the flow of patients among regions. 
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is the same as that of the number of competing hospitals, except that the summation is conducted 
over private hospitals only. 
Ownership type dummies. In this study, the samples include three types of ownership: 
provincial, district, and private. Both provincial and district hospitals are public medical 
institutions. The ownership type dummies associated with provincial and private ownership are 
introduced into the model to capture the difference in efficiency among hospitals with different 
ownership types, where a district hospital is the reference category. According to the original 
survey, all of the private hospitals among the sample were for-profit. 
Regional dummies. Regional dummies are used to identify associations between 
efficiency and the regional business environment which is not explained by regional explanatory 
variables, such as HHI, the number of competing hospitals, or the number of competing private 
hospitals. The concentration of hospitals in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City is much more 
remarkable than that in other regions.10 This may indicate that they are different from the other 
regions in some condition affecting efficiency of hospitals. Hence, the dummies for Hanoi and 
Ho Chi Minh City are included in the model. 
Time trend dummies. If there exists a time trend in the technological progress of health 
care delivery across the sample regions, the efficiency of hospitals may also have a time trend. 
Time trend dummies for the years 2012 and 2013 are included in the model to control such a 
trend of change in efficiency from the reference year 2011. 
(Table 1 Here) 
The list of input, output, and explanatory variables is shown in Table 1. Most of them are 
taken from the data of the original survey. The calculation of HHI, the number of competing 
hospitals, and the number of competing private hospitals are based on the basic information from 
                                            
10 The share of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City with respect to the number of provincial, district and 
private hospitals was 17 percent (in 2012), 5.6 percent (in 2012), and 43 percent (in 2013), respectively 
(Ministry of Health 2013). 
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the listed hospitals as well as the data of the original survey. The descriptive statistics of selected 
indicators from the listed hospitals are presented in Table 2. 
(Table 2 Here) 
In order to make a dataset for analysis, this study uses the pooled data from 114 sample 
hospitals obtained by the original survey. Hence, the number of samples should be 342 in total. 
However, the data from samples including an entry to or withdrawal from the market in the 
middle of a year may not represent the true relationship between input and output due to the 
characteristics of the data.11 Samples that met that condition were therefore removed from the 
dataset. Moreover, the samples that did not have all of the data in Table 1 as of all estimation 
periods as well as the samples which had abnormal data were also eliminated. As a result, 304 
samples remain in the dataset for DEA, the first part of the analysis. The descriptive statistics of 
the data are shown in Table 3. 
(Table 3 Here) 
 
7. Estimation results 
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the input-oriented pure technical efficiency scores of 
the samples in the dataset for DEA created in Section 6. The mean of the efficiency scores of 
provincial, district, and private hospitals are 0.767, 0.793, and 0.774, respectively. It also shows 
the descriptive statistics of the data from the samples, the estimated efficiency scores of which 
are less than unity, since only the samples satisfying that condition should be included in the 
dataset for the truncated regression analysis, as described in Section 4. It contains 242 samples, 
the descriptive statistics of which are shown in Table 5. 
(Table 4 Here) 
                                            
11 The input indicators (e.g. the number of medical doctors) are as of the end of a year, while the output 
indicators (e.g. the number of inpatient discharges) are the flow realized for a year. 
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(Table 5 Here) 
In the truncated regression analysis, two types of models were estimated. Both include 
all of the explanatory variables in Table 1, except the number of competing hospitals and the 
number of competing private hospitals. Model 1 includes the number of competing hospitals as 
well as HHI. It aims to analyze the relationship between efficiency and the competition level 
decomposed into the number of competitors and the degree of concentration in the market. In 
Model 2, the number of competing hospitals in Model 1 is replaced with the number of 
competing private hospitals in order to analyze the relationship between efficiency and the 
number of private competitors. Those two models were estimated for both the actual-bed-based 
HHI and the inpatient-discharge-based HHI so that the impact of the difference in assumption of 
the basis of output share calculation on the result could be observed. 
(Table 6 Here) 
Table 6 presents the results of bootstrapping which provide the confidence intervals of 
the coefficients of the explanatory variables in Model 1 and Model 2, as well as the results of the 
truncated regression analysis. Note that a positive (negative) coefficient of an explanatory 
variable implies negative (positive) correlation between efficiency and the explanatory variable. 
First of all, let us take a look at the bootstrap result of Model 1 in the case of 
actual-bed-based HHI. Regarding the control variables, ALOS has a statistically significant (at 5 
percent significance level) positive coefficient. The inferred sign of its coefficient is the same as 
expected. The coefficient of the regional dummies of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are negative 
and statistically significant (at 10 percent significance level). One of the key results concerns the 
ownership type dummies. The coefficient of the provincial ownership dummy is negative and 
statistically significant (at 10 percent significance level), while that of the private ownership 
dummy is positive and statistically significant (at 5 percent significance level). This shows that 
the provincial hospitals have significantly higher efficiency than the district hospitals and that 
the private hospitals have significantly lower efficiency than the district hospitals. Another 
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important result is in relation to the competition level in the market. The number of competing 
hospitals has a statistically significant positive coefficient (at 10 percent significance level), 
though HHI does not have a statistically significant coefficient. Hence, what matters about the 
efficiency of the hospitals is not the degree of concentration in the market but the number of 
competitors, which is negatively correlated with the efficiency of the hospitals. Almost the same 
results as above are obtained in the case of inpatient-discharge-based HHI. 
The bootstrap results of Model 2 are similar to those of Model 1. In particular, the 
number of competing private hospitals has a significant and negative correlation with the 
efficiency of the hospitals, while the degree of concentration in the market does not have a 
significant correlation with it. Again, the difference in the assumption of the basis of output 
share calculation has little impact on the bootstrap results of Model 2. 
 
8. Discussion 
The results of the empirical analysis in the previous section are twofold. First, the provincial 
hospitals are significantly more efficient and the private hospitals significantly less so than 
district hospitals. Second, both the number of competing hospitals and the number of competing 
private hospitals have a significant negative correlation with the efficiency of the hospitals, 
while the degree of concentration in the market has no significant correlation with it. 
Table 5 shows that provincial hospitals have the largest ALOS and private hospitals 
have the smallest ALOS among the three ownership types of hospitals. The Welch’s 𝑡𝑡-test 
indicates a statistically significant difference in the mean of ALOS between any two types of 
hospitals (at 1 percent significance level). It appears to be consistent with the fact that services 
offered at private facilities tend to focus on specialties, the services of which are easy to 
implement as well as attractive to patients (Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group 
2013). This may suggest the possibility that provincial hospitals have the most sophisticated 
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inpatient case-mix while private hospitals have the least sophisticated case-mix among the three 
ownership types of hospitals. Nevertheless, the efficiency of provincial hospitals is significantly 
higher than that of district hospitals and private hospitals, which is a point of the first result. 
The second result is opposite to Dalmau-Matarrodona and Puig-Junoy (1998) with 
respect to the number of competing hospitals; however, it is consistent with Chua, Palangkaraya 
and Yong (2011) with respect to the number of private competing hospitals. One of the possible 
interpretations is that the increase in the number of competing hospitals and/or the number of 
competing private hospitals leads to more competition for scarce input, which lowers the 
efficiency of the hospitals. In particular, medical doctors are likely to be recognized as scarce 
input by hospitals, since their number will not increase significantly in a short period of time. 
The situation may be worsened by a mismatch between the demand and the supply of health 
professionals. According to Ministry of Health and Health Partnership Group (2015), an 
assessment in Hai Duong Province showed signs that excessive numbers of health workers were 
being trained, especially at the secondary level. This implies that the demand for skilled medical 
doctors by hospitals is not sufficiently fulfilled by training institutions which intend to primarily 
supply secondary-level health professionals. This argument is similar to Palangkaraya and 
Yong’s (2011) interpretation of the results of their empirical analysis. If that is the case, the 
second result also suggests the possibility that competition for scarce input is more closely 
related to the number of competitors and private competitors than to the level of concentration in 
the market. In that sense, an increase in the number of competitors and private competitors may 
account for a more significant change in the level of competition than the level of concentration 
in the market, which represents reallocation of the market shares among the hospitals. 
As described in Section 2, it is difficult for many district hospitals and CHCs to employ 
enough medical doctors. This may reflect that competition for medical doctors among hospitals 
is quite severe all over the country, even in urban areas. Moreover, an overlap of specialties may 
lead to competition for specialized medical doctors among the hospitals. According to Table 7, 
 22 
 
the percentage of private hospitals that have a specific specialty is in general between those of 
the provincial hospitals and the district hospitals, apart from outpatient departments, general 
internal medicine, general surgery, and emergency departments, which almost all hospitals have 
regardless of the ownership type. This shows that there exists a considerable overlap of coverage 
in terms of the specialty among the different ownership types of hospitals, as far as the samples 
from the original survey are concerned. 
Another link between the increase in the competition level and decrease in technical 
efficiency of the hospitals may lie in misallocation of resources through competition for state 
funding among public hospitals. The original survey revealed that only one hospital out of 92 
public hospitals covered all of the operating costs through its revenues only. If this represents the 
situation of public hospitals located in urban areas on average, most of the public hospitals in 
Vietnam are likely to depend on state funding more or less to cover operating costs. Hence, an 
increase in the level of competition in the market is likely to lead to more competition among 
public hospitals for state funding, especially in terms of investments to attract more patients. The 
problem is that the allocation of state funds for health care is generally based on input at the 
provincial level (Tien et al. 2011). This will provide hospitals competing for state funds with 
incentives that are incompatible with the efficient use of scarce input. For instance, hospitals 
have an incentive to increase the number of beds to obtain more funding from the state in the 
absence of a national hospital plan which defines a target of the number of beds (Tien et al. 2011). 
Thus, an increase in the level of competition in the market can lower the efficiency of public 
hospitals though the misallocation of resources associated with competition for state funding. 
 
9. Conclusion 
This study analyzed the pure technical efficiency of the hospitals in six regions of Vietnam and 
provided empirical evidence that provincial hospitals had significantly higher efficiency than 
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district hospitals and private hospitals had significantly lower efficiency than district hospitals. It 
also showed that both the number of competing hospitals and the number of competing private 
hospitals had a statistically significant negative correlation with the efficiency of the hospitals. If 
market-oriented policies to stimulate competition among hospitals lead to a resource allocation 
problem through competition for scarce input, the latter result may suggest that they work 
adversely as a result. More detailed data and analyses are required to identify the rationale of a 
hospital’s decision-making behind those findings, especially with respect to competition for 
scarce input. Nevertheless, I believe that this study is the first attempt to examine using a 
quantitative approach how competition and ownership are related to the efficiency of hospitals in 
Vietnam. 
Those results imply that the performance of for-profit private hospitals in terms of 
efficiency is not necessarily better than that of public hospitals and that there exists a negative 
link between the level of competition in the market and efficiency of the hospitals. In that sense, 
the market-oriented policies, especially those associated with emerging private hospitals and the 
extension of public hospital autonomy, may not work as expected under the current framework 
of health care delivery in Vietnam. Needless to say, however, the results of this study should not 
be directly connected with practical decision-making on the policy of health care delivery of 
hospitals, since they depend on several assumptions and the limited availability of data. A 
greater accumulation of empirical analyses to conduct rigorous and careful evaluation of the 
policies is required in this regard. 
It is possible to extend this study in various directions. One direction is an additional 
analysis of the other regions in Vietnam using the same approach. By virtue of the methodology, 
the results of this study rely on the sample hospitals. This additional analysis is not only helpful 
but also necessary in order to examine to what extent the findings of this study hold true for 
hospitals in the other regions of Vietnam, especially in rural areas. Another direction is to 
elaborate on the measurement of the competition in the market. The approach used in this study 
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to calculate HHI and the number of competitors admittedly depends on some strong assumptions. 
More rigorous delineation of the geographic markets based on the detailed data of the flow of 
patients among regions will allow for the calculation of HHI and the number of competitors 
more strictly for each of the hospitals. Moreover, this study solely focuses on the analysis of pure 
technical efficiency for the reason stated in Section 4. However, comparing the results of overall 
technical efficiency with those of pure technical efficiency obtained in this study will be of more 
interest as the deregulation of health care market in Vietnam progresses so that a hospital will 
have more freedom to choose a scale of production. It is also a challenging but important 
extension of this study to incorporate service quality into the measurement of efficiency. In this 
study, central hospitals to which far greater medical resources are generally allocated than to the 
other hospitals were eliminated from the sample hospitals so that the effects of difference in 
service quality would be removed from the analysis. Similarly, it may contribute toward that 
purpose to eliminate private hospitals with fewer than 50 actual beds from the sample hospitals. 
However, service quality itself is not explicitly treated in the analysis; or equivalently, it is 
assumed that there exists no difference in the service quality of medical treatment of inpatients 
and outpatients among all of the analyzed samples. The development of empirical analysis in 
this regard is important, though evaluation and adjustment of service quality has many 
difficulties to be addressed in practice. Finally, the relationship between congestion and 
efficiency is an important viewpoint of analysis of health care delivery in Vietnam. It is said that 
patients in Vietnam are inclined to concentrate in large hospitals, such as central and provincial 
hospitals. If that is the case, congestion in those hospitals may result in the decline of their 
efficiency through conflict among different outputs. Though such an analysis is beyond the 
scope of this study, more empirical analysis in the local context of Vietnam is required. 
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Table 1 Input, output and explanatory variables 
 
  
Note: OS denotes the original survey by the author; MOH/DOHs denotes the Ministry of Health or 
the Department of Health that was in charge of the region where the sample hospitals were located. 
 
Category Description Data Source
Input Number of medical doctors (FTE) OS
Number of assistant doctors (FTE) OS
Number of nurses (FTE) OS
Number of actual beds OS
Output Number of inpatient discharges OS
Number of outpatient physician visits OS
Explanatory Average length of stay OS
variables Harfindahl-Hirschman Index MOH/DOHs, OS
Number of competing hospitals MOH/DOHs
Number of competing private hospitals MOH/DOHs
Ownership type dummies (provincial, private) MOH/DOHs, OS
Regional dummies (Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City) OS
Time trend dummies (2012, 2013) -
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the data of the listed hospitals
 
Source: MOH/DOHs and the original survey by the author. 
Note: SD denotes the standard deviation; N denotes the number of hospitals. 
.
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
2011 Central 839.3 600.3 10 43,292.0 41,238.0 10 379,203.4 350,645.0 10
Provincial 701.4 440.4 25 36,957.6 21,900.6 25 352,252.8 191,899.1 25
District 151.1 78.9 69 9,319.6 6,382.9 69 235,303.7 198,442.2 69
Other 301.9 247.6 21 12,453.6 11,055.0 18 132,513.1 177,674.2 18
Private 108.6 112.1 42 6,684.2 8,312.6 42 84,360.9 86,698.8 42
2012 Central 888.6 691.6 10 45,549.2 42,442.9 10 433,571.3 392,887.1 10
Provincial 696.6 415.4 25 38,186.8 21,017.3 25 361,051.0 206,140.1 25
District 162.9 87.3 69 10,522.3 7,365.4 69 250,670.8 208,952.2 69
Other 332.9 268.2 19 13,374.9 12,378.7 14 177,130.6 222,983.9 14
Private 112.2 112.9 43 6,850.4 8,356.8 43 90,034.0 92,453.5 43
2013 Central 919.6 728.8 10 48,066.2 44,382.2 9 502,677.6 480,315.4 9
Provincial 717.2 434.7 25 37,230.0 20,103.5 25 356,863.1 206,691.1 25
District 175.4 96.5 70 10,932.1 8,147.5 70 257,021.8 222,719.3 70
Other 336.9 261.4 20 13,326.3 12,683.9 15 186,232.3 216,578.3 15
Private 115.3 115.2 45 6,579.5 7,955.0 45 102,808.9 113,563.3 45
Number of outpatient physician visitsNumber of inpatient dischargesNumber of actual beds
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of the data of the samples for DEA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MOH/DOHs and the original survey by the author. 
Note: SD denotes the standard deviation. 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Number of medical doctors (FTE) 158.9 99.2 37.0 31.0 52.0 32.5
  Of which, post-graduate medical doctors (FTE) 84.2 58.3 16.5 19.4 28.3 22.8
Number of assistant doctors (FTE) 21.1 31.2 22.0 15.0 4.36 5.59
Number of nurses (FTE) 314.3 223.9 59.8 49.4 81.8 74.5
  Of which, bachleor's degree or higher (FTE) 17.3 14.3 2.81 6.21 4.67 8.57
Number of actual beds 670.5 426.4 154.4 78.2 146.5 110.1
Number of inpatient discharges 35,172.9 19,990.7 9,464.6 5,974.0 9,335.9 8,806.8
Number of outpatient physician visits 371,888.0 203,118.4 225,044.4 179,118.4 122,021.5 88,078.3
Average length of stay 7.06 1.77 5.19 1.49 4.12 1.14
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, actual-bed-based 615.7 411.7 1,007.4 660.8 1,025.0 711.1
Number of competing hospitals, actual-bed-based 46.4 13.7 35.6 19.0 35.8 19.4
Number of competing private hospitals, actual-bed-based 12.0 4.20 9.29 5.55 9.28 5.79
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, inpatient-discharge-based 666.1 490.9 1,114.3 792.8 1,122.8 840.2
Number of competing hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 45.1 13.2 34.6 18.2 34.8 18.7
Number of competing private hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 12.0 4.20 9.29 5.55 9.28 5.79
Number of samples 20 62 18
ProvincialDescription District Private
2011
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Number of medical doctors (FTE) 166.1 101.4 39.6 33.2 57.5 32.2
  Of which, post-graduate medical doctors (FTE) 90.4 59.5 17.9 20.4 33.4 23.1
Number of assistant doctors (FTE) 20.1 29.7 22.0 16.8 7.67 12.3
Number of nurses (FTE) 320.7 227.7 63.6 51.8 94.8 73.4
  Of which, bachleor's degree or higher (FTE) 21.7 16.3 3.16 6.45 5.56 8.56
Number of actual beds 666.6 397.3 162.3 82.9 146.7 110.3
Number of inpatient discharges 37,229.4 21,741.6 10,459.1 6,880.9 10,432.1 8,734.9
Number of outpatient physician visits 381,189.5 220,037.5 239,685.0 191,249.2 140,073.6 91,586.3
Average length of stay 7.02 1.94 5.23 1.31 4.03 1.28
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, actual-bed-based 604.2 390.7 989.8 610.7 985.5 652.7
Number of competing hospitals, actual-bed-based 46.5 13.4 35.0 18.8 35.8 19.2
Number of competing private hospitals, actual-bed-based 12.1 3.69 9.15 5.26 9.22 5.46
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, inpatient-discharge-based 653.3 455.8 1,036.9 640.2 1,006.1 645.3
Number of competing hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 45.2 12.9 34.1 18.1 34.8 18.5
Number of competing private hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 12.1 3.69 9.15 5.26 9.22 5.46
Number of samples 20 62 18
Description Provincial
2012
District Private
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Number of medical doctors (FTE) 173.3 102.0 43.8 38.1 62.1 35.8
  Of which, post-graduate medical doctors (FTE) 97.5 64.5 20.4 23.6 36.5 24.5
Number of assistant doctors (FTE) 20.2 27.3 23.0 18.3 8.60 16.6
Number of nurses (FTE) 327.5 223.2 70.1 61.5 109.8 80.0
  Of which, bachleor's degree or higher (FTE) 27.6 19.7 4.69 8.95 11.2 19.1
Number of actual beds 679.2 402.9 172.4 90.0 153.8 113.2
Number of inpatient discharges 36,018.0 20,444.0 10,574.0 7,184.6 9,460.9 7,894.7
Number of outpatient physician visits 374,899.5 223,604.4 242,393.5 204,431.8 132,664.4 94,635.9
Average length of stay 6.83 1.95 5.13 1.37 3.95 1.32
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, actual-bed-based 594.7 392.0 974.6 597.2 903.6 606.6
Number of competing hospitals, actual-bed-based 46.5 13.3 35.2 18.5 37.7 18.5
Number of competing private hospitals, actual-bed-based 12.1 3.63 9.28 5.11 9.8 5.21
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, inpatient-discharge-based 639.3 447.6 1,010.3 630.7 919.7 611.6
Number of competing hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 45.2 12.8 34.3 17.8 36.6 17.8
Number of competing private hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 12.1 3.63 9.28 5.11 9.8 5.21
Number of samples 20 64 20
Provincial District PrivateDescription
2013
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Table 4 Estimation results of input-oriented pure technical efficiency 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Note: SD denotes the standard deviation; N denotes the number of samples. 
 
Mean SD Min Max N
Provincial 0.767 0.191 0.292 1.000 60
District 0.793 0.178 0.235 1.000 188
Private 0.774 0.200 0.321 1.000 56
All samples
Mean SD Min Max N
Provincial 0.731 0.180 0.292 0.998 52
District 0.737 0.160 0.235 0.999 148
Private 0.699 0.175 0.321 0.988 42
Samples with efficiency < 1
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of the data of the samples for the truncated regression 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MOH/DOHs and the original survey by the author. 
Note: SD denotes the standard deviation.
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Number of medical doctors (FTE) 151.2 100.0 36.9 33.0 56.0 30.6
  Of which, post-graduate medical doctors (FTE) 81.9 60.2 16.6 21.13 32.2 23.0
Number of assistant doctors (FTE) 23.4 32.1 22.9 15.0 4.81 6.05
Number of nurses (FTE) 304.3 224.7 60.9 53.2 96.5 79.8
  Of which, bachleor's degree or higher (FTE) 17.7 15.0 3.11 6.79 6.38 9.61
Number of actual beds 634.2 399.4 156.3 79.8 154.5 120.7
Number of inpatient discharges 33,657.9 19,705.6 8,929.2 5,749.5 9,299.2 9,467.2
Number of outpatient physician visits 340,553.6 178,333.0 193,509.7 151,883.5 115,135.9 78,810.2
Average length of stay 7.02 1.79 5.38 1.37 4.22 1.15
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, actual-bed-based 566.5 348.1 1,060.8 678.3 933.6 675.8
Number of competing hospitals, actual-bed-based 47.6 12.0 34.0 18.9 38.2 19.3
Number of competing private hospitals, actual-bed-based 12.2 3.73 8.80 5.42 9.85 5.97
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, inpatient-discharge-based 619.4 448.4 1,186.1 823.7 989.0 758.2
Number of competing hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 46.3 11.5 33.1 18.2 37.1 18.6
Number of competing private hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 12.2 3.73 8.80 5.42 9.85 5.97
Number of samples 18 51 13
Description
2011
Provincial District Private
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Number of medical doctors (FTE) 171.5 106.0 37.1 17.5 59.1 33.3
  Of which, post-graduate medical doctors (FTE) 89.3 62.4 16.2 10.84 36.5 24.5
Number of assistant doctors (FTE) 23.3 32.4 24.2 17.5 9.83 14.3
Number of nurses (FTE) 328.7 242.5 59.7 33.8 99.5 82.0
  Of which, bachleor's degree or higher (FTE) 22.0 16.7 3.48 7.05 6.67 9.86
Number of actual beds 638.8 375.1 160.9 66.6 161.0 123.9
Number of inpatient discharges 33,963.7 20,374.1 9,748.2 4,984.0 9,610.6 9,437.0
Number of outpatient physician visits 370,404.5 178,671.8 210,832.3 157,552.7 135,897.7 86,715.5
Average length of stay 7.24 1.99 5.47 1.18 4.27 1.09
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, actual-bed-based 586.9 369.6 1,011.4 630.0 1,029.5 641.1
Number of competing hospitals, actual-bed-based 47.3 13.0 34.5 18.8 33.6 19.3
Number of competing private hospitals, actual-bed-based 12.2 4.00 9.06 5.13 8.58 5.37
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, inpatient-discharge-based 607.0 364.1 1,071.3 665.6 1,071.4 654.7
Number of competing hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 45.9 12.6 33.6 18.0 32.7 18.7
Number of competing private hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 12.2 4.00 9.06 5.13 8.58 5.37
Number of samples 15 48 12
Description
2012
Provincial District Private
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Number of medical doctors (FTE) 171.3 104.3 39.5 24.1 58.0 37.3
  Of which, post-graduate medical doctors (FTE) 97.7 66.2 17.9 15.71 33.6 25.1
Number of assistant doctors (FTE) 21.2 27.6 26.6 19.1 10.1 17.7
Number of nurses (FTE) 331.8 228.4 63.5 47.0 100.9 81.5
  Of which, bachleor's degree or higher (FTE) 27.7 20.2 5.06 9.99 11.88 20.2
Number of actual beds 686.9 412.4 165.1 68.3 160.0 122.1
Number of inpatient discharges 36,193.8 20,988.7 8,983.0 4,778.2 9,008.9 8,337.3
Number of outpatient physician visits 366,506.5 226,471.9 206,894.1 172,165.2 115,981.8 91,758.1
Average length of stay 6.89 1.98 5.42 1.26 4.15 1.31
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, actual-bed-based 544.5 330.3 972.8 601.7 984.4 624.9
Number of competing hospitals, actual-bed-based 48.2 11.3 35.2 18.3 35.0 18.9
Number of competing private hospitals, actual-bed-based 12.6 3.01 9.35 4.94 9.06 5.29
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index, inpatient-discharge-based 595.4 413.1 1,029.7 652.8 1,002.5 628.9
Number of competing hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 46.8 10.8 34.3 17.6 34.1 18.2
Number of competing private hospitals, inpatient-discharge-based 12.6 3.01 9.35 4.94 9.06 5.29
Number of samples 19 49 17
Description
2013
Provincial District Private
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Table 6 Estimation results of the models 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Note: SE denotes the standard deviation; CI denotes the confidence interval; LB and UB denote the lower bound and the upper bound of the confidence 
interval, respectively. The shadowed CI indicates that the coefficient of the explanatory variable is statistically significant at the corresponding level of 
significance. 
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
Average length of stay 0.718 0.245 -0.163 1.148 0.194 1.090 0.334 1.064 0.694 0.241 -0.140 1.104 0.185 1.056 0.323 1.022
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.002
Number of competing hospitals 0.532 0.338 -0.389 1.293 -0.100 1.126 0.049 1.062 0.539 0.269 -0.359 1.100 0.007 0.963 0.131 0.910
Ownership (provincial) -1.245 0.643 -2.426 1.055 -2.233 0.247 -2.145 -0.288 -1.162 0.631 -2.305 1.111 -2.125 0.291 -2.010 -0.159
Ownership (private) 1.416 0.601 -0.722 2.606 0.297 2.398 0.621 2.276 1.449 0.618 -0.578 2.624 0.146 2.452 0.510 2.324
Region (Hanoi) -18.63 10.83 -43.42 11.95 -37.58 1.659 -35.27 -3.498 -17.59 8.756 -35.60 11.74 -31.40 0.602 -29.80 -4.494
Region (Ho Chi Minh City) -21.33 12.46 -49.92 14.28 -43.11 1.990 -40.67 -3.792 -19.81 9.77 -39.84 12.57 -35.16 0.002 -33.42 -5.146
Time trend 2012 -0.036 0.421 -1.279 1.257 -0.858 0.835 -0.700 0.632 0.005 0.430 -1.340 1.368 -0.867 0.870 -0.705 0.681
Time trend 2013 0.489 0.414 -1.060 1.356 -0.420 1.193 -0.186 1.109 0.521 0.427 -0.934 1.544 -0.387 1.284 -0.200 1.138
Sigma 0.997 0.206 0.355 1.402 0.645 1.356 0.740 1.323 1.006 0.211 0.359 1.419 0.597 1.355 0.720 1.326
Number of samples 242 242
Log-likelihood -35.40 -35.56
SE
99% CI 95% CI 90% CI
Description
Actual-bed-based HHI
Truncated regression Bootstrap
Coefficient
Inpatient-discharge-based HHI
Truncated regression Bootstrap
Coefficient SE
99% CI 95% CI 90% CI
LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB LB UB
Average length of stay 0.715 0.241 -0.099 1.137 0.228 1.083 0.361 1.046 0.706 0.245 -0.165 1.149 0.205 1.098 0.361 1.053
Harfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.000 -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Number of competing private hospitals 0.262 0.144 -0.224 0.605 -0.006 0.523 0.050 0.479 0.391 0.194 -0.361 0.776 -0.036 0.703 0.090 0.672
Ownership (provincial) -1.224 0.627 -2.373 0.848 -2.192 0.071 -2.077 -0.260 -1.191 0.638 -2.402 1.205 -2.176 0.267 -2.083 -0.146
Ownership (private) 1.457 0.603 -0.579 2.758 0.209 2.476 0.584 2.373 1.442 0.618 -0.552 2.727 0.285 2.474 0.557 2.360
Region (Hanoi) -4.119 1.917 -8.091 2.815 -7.262 -0.284 -6.901 -1.307 -4.523 2.475 -9.370 4.583 -8.327 1.334 -7.916 -0.409
Region (Ho Chi Minh City) -5.247 2.336 -10.31 3.055 -9.16 -0.575 -8.704 -1.841 -6.265 3.201 -12.22 6.807 -11.16 1.258 -10.57 -1.096
Time trend 2012 -0.067 0.413 -1.093 1.233 -0.838 0.736 -0.704 0.593 -0.126 0.434 -1.265 1.088 -0.898 0.724 -0.781 0.513
Time trend 2013 0.521 0.405 -0.896 1.446 -0.270 1.230 -0.092 1.115 0.460 0.424 -0.832 1.414 -0.424 1.215 -0.206 1.087
Sigma 0.988 0.202 0.321 1.378 0.615 1.329 0.736 1.298 1.006 0.211 0.338 1.429 0.639 1.382 0.749 1.345
Number of samples 242 242
Log-likelihood -34.73 -35.52
Inpatient-discharge-based HHI
Truncated regression Bootstrap
Coefficient SE
99% CI 95% CI 90% CI
Description
Actual-bed-based HHI
Truncated regression Bootstrap
Coefficient SE
99% CI 95% CI 90% CI
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Table 7 Share of hospitals with a specific specialty by ownership type [percent] 
 
  
Source: The original survey by the author. 
Note: The figures are as of the end of 2013. 
Provincial District Private
Outpatient department (OPD) 100.0 100.0 100.0
General internal medicine 95.7 97.1 90.9
General surgery 100.0 94.2 95.5
Emergency 91.3 91.3 86.4
Intensive Care Unit (ICU) 87.0 30.4 59.1
Anesthesiology 100.0 58.0 90.9
Blood transfusion and Hematology 47.8 17.4 40.9
Cardiovascular 100.0 29.0 59.1
Communicable diseases 78.3 62.3 22.7
Dermatology 52.2 31.9 54.5
Diabetes and endocrinology 78.3 31.9 45.5
Dialysis 60.9 11.6 36.4
Gastroenterology 73.9 21.7 59.1
Gerontology 47.8 21.7 18.2
Maxillo-facial-stomatology 91.3 69.6 81.8
Neoplasm and oncology 43.5 8.7 27.3
Neurology 60.9 11.6 36.4
Obstetrics and Gynecology 78.3 87.0 86.4
Ophthalmology 95.7 63.8 72.7
Orthopedics and trauma 91.3 27.5 59.1
Otorhinolaryngology 95.7 69.6 86.4
Pediatrics 78.3 88.4 81.8
Psychiatry 21.7 7.2 9.1
Renal diseases and Urology 73.9 15.9 59.1
Respiratory 73.9 21.7 45.5
Tuberculosis 30.4 14.5 4.5
Number of sample hospitals 23 69 22
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要約 
本研究では、ベトナムの 6 地域の一般病院に対し独自の調査を行い収集したミクロデ
ータを用いて、公立・私立の別や市場における競争の多寡が病院の純技術効率性にど
のように関係しているかについて調べた。その結果、郡立病院と比較すると、省立病
院の効率性は有意に高く、私立病院の効率性は有意に低かった。また、競合する総病
院数と効率性の間には、有意な負の相関がみられ、競合する私立病院数についても同
じ結果が得られた。他方で、市場の集中度と効率性の間には、有意な相関がみられな
かった。 
このような結果は、ベトナムにおいては、病院間の競争が、それらの間の資源配分に
問題を生じさせることを示唆しているかもしれない。 
キーワード：技術効率性、所有関係、競争、包絡分析法、ブートストラップ法
